Profile of Shi’ite Foreign Fighters in Syria

By Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
Wednesday, March 26th, 2014 @ 1:25AM

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The Shi’ite foreign fighters fighting in Syria can be divided into two main groups: one consists of Hezbollah operatives, of whom there are several thousand, sent by the organization to participate in offensive and defensive operations in Syria. The other consists of Shi’ite foreign fighters from Iraq and other Arab-Muslim countries who are sent to Syria to fight in support of the regime. In our assessment there are between 4,000 and 5,000 such fighters, most of them from Iraq. In retrospect, it can be seen that the Iraqis exported fighters to Syria, both those who established the Al-Nusra Front, a branch of Al-Qaeda fighting against the Syrian regime, as well as some Shi’ite foreign fighters who fight for the Syrian regime. The Shi’ite fighters from the Arab-Muslim countries are organized into military units, the most prominent of which is the Abu al-Fadhel al-Abbas Brigade. There are also smaller military formations (See below).

Scores of coffins of Shi’ite foreign fighters who were killed in Syria, brought to Iraq for burial (Bahrainforums.com)

The overwhelming majority of Shi’ite foreign fighters from Lebanon, Iraq and other countries are young (like the foreign fighters who join the ranks of the Al-Nusra Front and The Islamic State). The socio-economic status of most of them is low (Al- Hayat, June 30, 2013). Most of them have religious motivation, i.e., defending the Shi’ite holy places, and fighting against the “takfirs” (Salafist-jihadi organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the global jihad). Sometimes their motivation is also economic (gifts of money and salaries for Iraqi foreign fighters in Syria).

An examination of the names of approximately 200 Hezbollah operatives who were killed in Syria reveals that more than half of them came from south Lebanon. Also prominent was the number who came from the Beqa’a Valley (more than a third). The rest came from other Shi’ite population centers (for example the southern suburb of Beirut and north Lebanon).5 An examination of the names of 71 Iraqi foreign fighters killed in Syria revealed that most of them were from south Iraq and the Shi’ite neighborhoods of Baghdad. Organizationally speaking, thirteen of them were Abu al-Fadhel al-Abbas Brigade operatives. The rest belonged to other Shi’ite military formations, most of them linked to the Abu al-Fadhel al-Abbas Brigade.

Overview 

1. Most of the Shi’ite foreign fighters in Syria have extensive battle experience. They are experienced in guerilla tactics gained during their years of fighting Israel (Hezbollah) and the United States and the coalition of Western countries (the Iraqi militias). Many of them were trained in Iran or their countries of origin (Lebanon, Iraq) while fighting Israel or the United States.

2. According to the Arab media, the Shi’ite foreign fighters receive accelerated military training in Iran before they go to Syria (similar to the training given to the Sunni jihadists when they arrive in Syria). The training courses last for a number of weeks and are held in Qods Force camps. They learn guerilla tactics, field survival, self-defense and sniping. They also receive Khomeini-oriented Shi’ite religious instruction (Alsharq.net, June 13, 2012, Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2013). Signs of their Iranian orientation can be found in the death notices where pictures of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and sometimes the Ayatollah Khomeini also appear.

3. The conclusion drawn from this study is that Iran is primarily responsible for the presence of the Shi’ite foreign fighters from around Arab-Muslim world who fight in the service of the Assad regime in Syria. Iran supports them not only by providing religious justification, but money and equipment as well. In addition, in our assessment Iran is involved in operating the Shi’ite military units in collaboration and close coordination with the Syrian army and the Assad regime’s security forces. Handling Hezbollah and the other Shi’ite foreign fighters in Syria follows Iran’s strategy of supporting the Syrian regime through proxies, limiting its own direct military intervention in the fighting.

4. The direct Iranian involvement in the Syrian civil war is, in our assessment, several hundred soldiers, primarily members of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards’ (IIRG) Qods Force. The Qods Force is an elite framework whose tasks include support for the Syrian regime and the subversion of Shi’ite communities around the Arab-Muslim world. (Recently the Qods Force was involved in an attempt to smuggle weapons from Syria to the Gaza Strip by sea.) Iranian support for the Syrian regime includes establishing militia units of Shi’ites and Alawites; providing weapons, military advice, guidance and training; as well as economic aid and political and propaganda support. The Qods Force, which has strong contacts with the Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi’ite militias, recruits and handles Shi’ite foreign fighters in Iraq, Lebanon and other countries. Thus Iran’s extensive support (alongside Russia’s) is a strategic prop, enabling the Syrian regime to survive in the civil war whose end is not in sight and whose outcome is not clear.

5. Hezbollah’s operatives make up a skilled military force, well motivated and loyal to the Syrian regime. Hezbollah forces in Syria are handled through close collaboration with the Syrian security forces (according to the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Ra’i, the Syrian army and Hezbollah maintain a joint operation room). Hezbollah operatives played an important role in the successful and strategically important campaign for the city of Al-Qusayr in the summer of 2013, suffering heavy losses until the city was conquered by Hezbollah on June 5, 2013.2 Over the past few months Hezbollah operatives have been integrated into the supporting units of the Syrian army’s campaigns in the rural areas east of Damascus; the areas around Aleppo; and the ongoing campaign along the Syria-Lebanon border (the Al-Qalamoun mountains, especially the city of Yabrud, which according to the media the Syrian forces, with Hezbollah backup, are about to complete their takeover). Hezbollah considers the Al- Qalamoun mountains, mainly the city of Yabrud, as the region from which the organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda dispatch their car bombs and suicide bombers to Lebanon.

6. The Shi’ite units operating in Syria are sometimes heterogeneous and composed of Shi’ite foreign fighters from various countries. In some instances the units are homogeneous, especially when the foreign fighters are Iraqi and originated in the Shi’ite militias that waged a guerilla war against the American army and its allies (until the United States withdrew from Iran at the end of 2011). Prominent among the Iraqi units is the Abu al-Fadhel al-Abbas Brigade; smaller Shi’ite units fight alongside it. Despite the guerilla experience of the Iraqi foreign fighters, in our assessment they are less proficient as fighters than Hezbollah. However, the Shi’ite foreign fighters play an important role in defending the religious sites sacred to Shi’a, especially the grave of Al-Set Zaynab, south of Damascus.3

7. The presence of Shi’ite foreign fighters in Syria has several ramifications: Hezbollah and other Shi’ite fighters support the Syrian security forces and improve their ability to fight the rebels. To a certain extent, in our assessment, they balance the involvement of foreign Sunni jihadists in Syria, and at the same time greatly complicate the civil war and intensify its religious-sectarian nature. In addition, Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria has resulted in the trickling of Al-Qaeda and global jihad terrorism into Lebanon, threatening to undermine Lebanon’s already fragile internal stability and possibly eroding Hezbollah’s status. It might also aggravate the Arab-Muslim Sunni-Shi’ite rift. In our assessment, Iran might profit from the involvement of Shi’ite foreign fighters in Syria when they return to their countries of origin, especially Iraq. Their return is liable to create for the Iranians, especially the Qods Force, ready-made networks of trained, battle-experienced fighters that can be leveraged by Iran for its terrorism and subversive activities.

The whole study can be found here… 

 


Categories: ACD/EWI Blog, Iran, Latest News, Middle East Conflicts, Shari'a, Syria

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