Recent reports of chemical weapons taken from Syrian military bases by al Qaeda groups, ISIS and the al Nusra Front should highlight the flaws of Obama’s Iran deal.
On August 18, 2014, Obama marked “an important achievement in our ongoing effort to counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction by eliminating Syria’s declared (emphasis added) chemical weapons.”
The deal with Iran is similar. Not surprisingly, Iran maintains it “will allow international inspections only within the framework of the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty,”
If the Syrian mistake was not bad enough, the President and his minions have intensified their pressure on members of Congress, especially the Democrats, as well as other public figures to support its very bad deal with Iran.
With funds and protection mainly from the U.S., the Mullahs’ ambitions would not be limited to developing nuclear weapons, or to simply use them as a deterrent. They promised, and there is no reason to disbelieve them, to use them. Israel may be the Mullahs’ first choice to attack with nuclear weapons, but it’s not the only one.
Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham, notes, “The reluctance of the international community to act forcibly regarding undeclared Syrian chemical weapon capabilities is a very bad sign.” In “Syria’s Chemical Weapon Obfuscations,” Shoham, who specializes in chemical and biological warfare, explains why this reluctance puts into doubt the “full implementation of intelligence-gathering operations and effective monitoring of the Iranian nuclear program. This is all the more so, given the skillfulness, sophistication, and determination of Iran’s counter-intelligence apparatus.”
In the piece cited above, published earlier this month by BESA, Shoham points out the similarities between the flawed Syrian weapons monitoring agreement and the P5+1 deal with Iran:
“Monitoring weapons-of-mass-destruction programs in general is inherently difficult, due to the constant need for updated intelligence that distinguishes, foremost, between dual-use and single-use technologies. Moreover, the required intelligence must cover a range of types of facility, both in the military sector and defense establishment civilian sector, as well as certain facilities that are ostensibly purely civilian. It must also provide details of their locations, contents, and activities. Inevitably, such intelligence tasks are often very complicated.
“The same complexity pertains to the nuclear sphere. Effective implementation of the Iran nuclear deal is subject to good intelligence and effective monitoring… It raises doubts about full implementation of intelligence gathering operations and effective monitoring of the Iranian nuclear program. This is all the more so, given the skillfulness, sophistication, and determination of Iran’s counter-intelligence apparatus.”
Would it be unreasonable to think that the Obama administration’s willingness to make concessions to Assad regarding chemical weapons and then to sign a flawed deal with Iran was in the cards as early as 2009? It is not that outlandish if you recall Obama’s “secret” correspondence with Ayatollah Khamenei when he first took office in 2009, and the fact that Assad’s Syria is Iran’s protege.